Mogadishu, SOMALIA – In a post on X (formerly Twitter) today, Hussein Sheikh-Ali “Hussein Moalim,” the National Security Advisor to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, vehemently dismissed a Voice of America (VoA) news report that argued Al-Shabab had reversed all Somali National Army (SNA) gains made over the last two years and was now collaborating with the Houthi militant group to expand its capabilities. Moalim’s response, which labeled the report as “rubbish” and claimed that “90% of liberated territories are still firmly under government control”. However, the facts on the ground paint a starkly different picture, revealing significant setbacks and ongoing challenges in the fight against terrorism and piracy in Somalia.
The Degradation of SNA Forces
The SNA forces, which have been at the forefront of the fight against Al-Shabab, have suffered significant setbacks and degradation over the past two years. The government had raised more than 12,000 soldiers, whose training was funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, this force has been severely depleted, with less than half of its original size remaining operational.
Similarly, the Gorgor forces, trained by Turkey, have been reduced to a shell of their former selves. Most of their commanders have either been killed in battle, are facing prosecution for losing battles, or have deserted their posts. The high attrition rate and the lack of effective leadership have severely undermined the Gorgor forces’ ability to conduct sustained operations against Al-Shabab. Despite Turkey’s efforts to replace the losses, the rate of attrition has outpaced the rate of replenishment, leaving the Gorgor forces in a precarious position.
The degradation of the regular SNA and Gorgor forces is a significant blow to the morale and confidence of the Somali people in their government’s ability to provide security and stability. The loss of well-trained and equipped soldiers, coupled with the lack of effective leadership, has created a vacuum that Al-Shabab has been quick to exploit. The terrorist group has capitalized on the weaknesses of the government forces to expand its influence and control, further eroding the credibility of the government’s claims of progress in the fight against terrorism.
Moreover, the degradation of the regular SNA and Gorgor forces raises serious questions about the sustainability and effectiveness of the international community’s support for Somalia’s security sector. The UAE and Turkey have invested significant resources in training and equipping these forces, but the high attrition rates and the lack of tangible results on the ground suggest that a fundamental rethink of the approach to security sector reform is needed. This may require a greater emphasis on building the institutional capacity and resilience of the Somali security forces, rather than just providing them with equipment and training.
The Erosion of Territorial Control
The NSA’s claim that “90% of liberated territories are still firmly under government control” is also questionable. At the peak of the liberation operations, the SNA had succeeded in retaking almost all of the Galgaduud region from Al-Shabab. However, the terrorist group has since managed to recapture several major districts and strategic locations, including El Buur, Caad, and Ruun Nirgood.
The government’s control over the remaining territories is tenuous at best, with most of the areas being isolated, disconnected, and surrounded by Al-Shabab. The SNA’s reliance on air and sea supply lines to maintain its presence in these areas is a clear indication of the fragility of the government’s control. The fact that Al-Shabab can effectively isolate and besiege government-held areas undermines the credibility of the NSA’s claims of firm control.
The erosion of territorial control is not only a military and security challenge but also a significant humanitarian and development concern. The isolation and besiegement of government-held areas by Al-Shabab have severely limited the ability of aid agencies and development organizations to access and support vulnerable populations. This has exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation in many parts of the country, with millions of Somalis facing food insecurity, displacement, and lack of access to basic services.
Moreover, the erosion of territorial control has significant implications for the political and economic stability of the country. The inability of the government to effectively control and govern large swaths of territory undermines its legitimacy and authority, and creates a permissive environment for the proliferation of criminal networks, armed groups, and extremist ideologies.
The Limited Scope of the War
The NSA’s assertion that “the Somali people are fighting [Al-Shabab] in every corner of the country” is also misleading. In reality, the war against Al-Shabab has been largely confined to parts of the HirShabelle and GalMudug states, with little to no significant operations in other regions of the country. This limited scope of the conflict contradicts the government’s narrative of a nationwide uprising against the terrorist group.
The failure to expand the fight against Al-Shabab beyond these two states can be attributed, in part, to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s inability to rally support for the offensive. Instead of focusing on the military campaign, the president seems to have been using it as a pivot to advance his political agenda, such as pushing for constitutional changes and seeking a term extension through technicalities. This lack of political will and strategic focus has undermined the effectiveness of the SNA’s operations and allowed Al-Shabab to regroup and regain lost ground.
The limited scope of the war against Al-Shabab is not only a reflection of the government’s lack of political will and strategic focus but also a symptom of the deeper structural and institutional weaknesses of the Somali state. The inability of the government to project its authority and control beyond a few key regions is a testament to the fragmentation and decentralization of power in the country, and the persistence of clan-based and regional loyalties that often trump national allegiances.
Moreover, the limited scope of the war highlights the need for a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Somalia. The focus on military operations alone, without addressing the underlying political, social, and economic grievances that fuel the conflict, is unlikely to lead to a sustainable and lasting peace. This requires a greater emphasis on dialogue, mediation, and inclusive governance, as well as a more concerted effort to address the root causes of the conflict, such as poverty, marginalization, and lack of access to justice and basic services.
The Persistence of Terrorist Financing
Perhaps the most damning evidence of the government’s failure to effectively combat Al-Shabab and the Islamic State is the terrorist groups’ continued ability to collect taxes, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. Despite the government’s claims of closing down some of Al-Shabab’s financial accounts, the fact remains that the group’s tax collectors continue to operate with impunity.
The failure to capture and prosecute these individuals, who are essential to Al-Shabab’s financial network in Somalia, raises serious questions about the government’s commitment to dismantling the group’s support infrastructure. Without a concerted effort to target Al-Shabab’s financial lifelines, the government’s claims of progress in the fight against the terrorist group ring hollow.
The persistence of terrorist financing is not only a security threat but also a significant economic and development challenge for Somalia. Al-Shabab’s ability to collect taxes and generate revenue through extortion, smuggling, and other illicit activities undermines the government’s ability to provide basic services and create an enabling environment for economic growth and investment. It also fuels corruption and undermines the rule of law, as government officials and security forces are often complicit in or beneficiaries of these illicit activities.
