The Somali Digest presents an analysis of the implications that a potential lifting of the arms embargo would have for Somali clan militias. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has engaged in a campaign to lift the international embargo imposed against the country since 1992. While the policy goal of successive administrations, this effort comes at a time when the military offensive against al-Shabaab in GalMudug and HirShabelle has stalled in the face of al-Shabaab’s fierce resistance and deadly counterattacks.
Mogadishu, SOMALIA.
The Somali Digest yesterday exclusively reported that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is considering a significant policy shift concerning Somalia. Multiple reliable sources have informed the Somali Digest that the Somali arms embargo will likely be lifted in an upcoming review by the UNSC. This change would pertain to the Somali government and key security agencies, such as the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the Somali Police Force, and the Somali Custodial Corps.
The Somali government has so far unsuccessfully advocated for the lifting of the embargo to include the Federal Member States (FMSs) and weapons for the irregular Ma’awisley clan militias, which have been supporting government operations. With the SNA increasingly reliant on these militias to help it clear and hold territory, the campaign to lift the embargo relates to a desire to increase the supply of weapons and other military equipment to these local groups.
Historical overview
The UNSC first imposed the international arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992. Since then, it has undergone several amendments. UNSC resolutions 1744 (2007) and 1844 (2008) allowed the federal government to receive or purchase weapons and other military equipment. However, because the Ma’awisley militia is not an official part of the SNA or other security sector institutions and might even have been guilty in the past of violating the arms embargo or obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the transfer of weapons and equipment to them is highly problematic.
Insufficient forces to take and hold territory
When local clans in the GalMudug and HirShabelle states revolted against al-Shabaab over its forced recruitment of locals and collection of taxes (both ‘zakat’ and the more hated ad-hoc ‘infaaq’), the federal government dispatched officials and Members of Parliament to mobilise fighters and supply them with weapons. With the support of these militias, the SNA liberated more territory from the militant group than any other offensive since Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean in 2014.
Nevertheless, al-Shabaab repeated its historic tactics of tactical withdrawals from major towns, often offering little to no resistance, before cutting off and putting a newly liberated settlement under siege. Lacking sufficient holding forces, the SNA has had to use US-trained Danab and Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces alongside its regular army as garrisons for towns and other strategic locations.
Reliance on clan-based militia
This has allowed al-Shabaab to continue enjoying freedom of movement around liberated towns and organise devastating counterattacks. Many of these attacks focused on the El Dheer district of the Galgaduud region, including locations such as Budbud and Masagaway, as well as the complete defeat of the SNA forces outside of Osweyne on 26 August. The last attack involved hundreds of al-Shabaab fighters and multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED).
In response to this pressure, federal and state-level authorities have turned increasingly to local clan-based militia forces to provide a cheap and numerous source of manpower. Concerningly, plans to register, pay monthly stipends, and eventually integrate these local forces into the SNA are still to be implemented. These fighters enjoy the support of local communities and offer detailed knowledge of the terrain and politics at the clan and subclan levels. Recent mobilisations have included the Hawiye subclans of Habargidir, Murusade, and Hawadle, as well as the Duduble, who pledged to provide fighters to secure their local areas and participate in offensive operations.
Limited capability of clan-based militia
While a valuable force multiplier, these clan-based militias receive poor training and often rely on their own communities to purchase weapons, ammunition and vehicles. Because of this, local militias often ‘only’ support the SNA’s offensive operations or secure already liberated territory. In both cases, their battlefield performance remains mixed.
An example of this occurred during recent fighting around the Ali Fooldheere area in the Middle Shabelle region. According to unconfirmed reports, clan-based militia failed to adequately support SNA units attempting to dislodge al-Shabaab fighters who had crossed onto the east bank of the Shabelle River. Eventually, a combined force of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers, supported by several days of artillery strikes, eliminated the jihadists or forced them to retreat.
Likewise, the performance of the Ma’awisley militia in defending their local areas has varied. A successful example of them defending their area occurred on 8 October, when it attacked and defeated a group of al-Shabaab fighters gathering in the Elka-Jowle and El Hassan Ali areas near Budbud in the Hobyo district. In contrast, on 5 October, in the Gadday area between Wisil and Ba’adweyn in the Mudug region, at least 30 Ma’awisley militiamen died in a battle with al-Shabaab which claimed to have killed 58 local fighters.
The risk of inter-clan conflict
However, while the Ma’awisley militia may (in some circumstances) provide a suitable holding force for a recently liberated village or local area, the arming of the militia risks sparking an arms race between communities or even triggering conflict.
Al-Shabaab has already recognised this opportunity and undertaken its countermobilisation efforts in GalMudug since December 2022. While the group has had some success in mobilising less powerful and/or less-armed clans, this exercise has served two purposes.
First, it provided the militant group with propaganda useful to mobilise other clans, especially those that might have felt threatened by the mobilisation of other communities with which they might be in conflict over land, access to resources or have a historic blood feud. Second, by mobilising clans, al-Shabaab also increased the likelihood of inter or intra-clan conflict based on the factors above.
The risk of conflict with the SNA
The reliance on Ma’awisley or other clan-based militia forces also risks creating conflict between local communities and the SNA. Currently, the Somali army remains largely a collection of clan-based militias or units based on shared clan or sub-clan affiliation. By arming or allowing local communities to arm these militias, there will be an ongoing risk that they will turn their guns on government forces. This could happen if the government soldiers attempt to intervene in a clan-based conflict or perform other tasks, such as arresting a clan member.
Caution needed
Although a more robust and better-equipped security apparatus could serve as a significant deterrent against internal and external threats, caution is warranted. The risk of arms falling into the wrong hands due to Somalia’s complex societal structure, characterised by deep-seated clan loyalties, is significant. Although analysts discuss the possible benefits of lifting the embargo, the related risks underline the need for a nuanced approach.
The SNA’s increasing reliance on clan-based militia for support in GalMudug and HirShabelle states presents a reason to exercise caution when considering lifting the arms embargo on Somalia. More work is necessary to study the ‘on the ground’ realities of those clan-based forces that the FGS already mobilised. Precisely, their location, size, weapons, equipment, history of conflict with other communities, and the potential for increasing tensions and conflict.