Mogadishu, SOMALIA – The Somali Cabinet’s decision in early April to order the closure of Ethiopian consulates in Garowe and Hargeisa, located in the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland, has brought to the forefront the deep-seated tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia on one hand, and, on the other hand, the growing political fragmentation within Somalia itself. The government’s justification for this move centered on allegations of Ethiopian interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. However, the failure of the Ethiopian consulates in Somalia to comply with the deadline set by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) highlights the limitations of the central government’s authority and the challenges it faces in asserting control over the country’s regions.
The Roots of the Conflict
The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1st, 2024, in which Ethiopia promised recognition for the breakaway region in exchange for sea access, marked a significant turning point in the relationship between the two countries. The FGS viewed this agreement as a direct threat to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, setting the stage for the current confrontation.
The situation was further complicated by the FGS’s creation of a new Constitution on March 30th, 2024. This move prompted Puntland to withdraw its membership and recognition of the federal government, underscoring the deep divisions within Somalia and the challenges the FGS faces in maintaining national unity. Puntland’s subsequent meeting with senior Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa on April 3rd to discuss strengthening trade ties, particularly regarding the utilization of the Garacad Port, directly challenged the FGS’s authority and led to the decision to order the closure of the Ethiopian consulates in Somalia.
Despite the FGS’s assertive stance, its ability to enforce the closure of the Ethiopian consulates in Somalia is very limited. The federal government lacks a presence in Puntland and Somaliland, and these regions have shown no inclination to comply with the FGS order. Puntland’s defiant statement, asserting that the directive “does not concern Puntland” and accusing the FGS of making it out of “enmity towards Puntland,” illustrates the depth of political fragmentation within Somalia and highlights the challenges the FGS faces in asserting its authority over these semi-autonomous regions.
Moreover, the FGS’s reliance on Ethiopian support and protection in four key regions – Hiran, Bay, Bakool, and Gedo – further constrains its ability to take a hard-line stance against Ethiopia. This dependency on Ethiopian backing leaves the FGS in a precarious position, as it must balance its desire to assert its sovereignty with the practical realities of its limited control over significant portions of the country.
Potential Economic Repercussions
As tensions continue to escalate, sources tell The Somali Digest that the FGS is considering further measures to pressure Ethiopia, including a potential ban on Ethiopian Airlines operating in Somalia or even prohibiting the airline from using Somali airspace.
The FGS’s deliberation on these potential measures demonstrates its desire to exert economic pressure on Ethiopia in response to the ongoing dispute over the Ethiopian consulates in Somalia. By targeting Ethiopian Airlines, a major economic player in the region, the Somali government hopes to gain leverage in its dealings with Ethiopia and force a resolution to the current crisis.
However, it is essential to consider the potential risks and unintended consequences of such actions. Banning Ethiopian Airlines from operating in Somalia or using Somali airspace could lead to a further deterioration of the already strained relationship between the two countries. It may also have negative repercussions for Somalia’s own economy, as Ethiopian Airlines plays a significant role in connecting Somalia to the rest of the world and facilitating trade and commerce.
Moreover, the effectiveness of these measures in achieving the FGS’s desired outcomes is uncertain. Ethiopia may choose to retaliate with its own economic sanctions or take other actions that could further escalate the crisis.
The Political Landscape in Somalia
The FGS’s order to shut down the Ethiopian consulates hasn’t gone as planned, really laying bare the deep tensions simmering between Somalia and Ethiopia. Not just that, it’s also spotlighting the growing splits within Somalia itself. Despite the firm directive, these consulates are still up and running, which really shows you how much the FGS is struggling to assert its grip over Somalia’s diverse and often divided regions.
