Mogadishu, SOMALIA – Based on interviews with current and former Gorgor soldiers, officers, and members of the local Macawisley militia, a troubling picture emerges of the state of Somalia’s elite Gorgor special forces. Trained by Türkiye since 2017, these soldiers were meant to be the vanguard in the fight against Al-Shabab. However, a combination of mounting losses, plummeting morale, and leadership failures has left the unit in a precarious position, with far-reaching implications for President Hassan Sheikh’s stated goal of defeating the terrorist group.
Desertions and Casualties Decimate Gorgor Ranks
According to TRT, Türkiye has trained more than 6,000 Gorgor soldiers since 2017. However, the current strength of the unit, which consists of the 17th Brigade (approximately 1,900 soldiers) and the 18th Brigade (around 2,100 soldiers), suggests that at least 2,000 soldiers have been lost to desertions and deaths. The majority of these losses have occurred over the past 12 months, coinciding with President Hassan Sheikh’s liberation operations, which have been stuck in Phase 1 for nearly two years.
The impact of these losses is most evident in the decimation of Gorgor’s leadership ranks. In the Mudug region alone, four battalion commanders have been lost to deaths and desertions and Al-Shabab attacks this year. Company commanders have also been hit hard, with many falling victim to attacks or facing court-martials. The death of the 18th Brigade’s commander in battle underscores the severity of the situation and the risks faced by those leading the fight against Al-Shabab.
The high attrition rate within Gorgor has taken a heavy toll on the morale of the soldiers who remain. Trained for rapid attack and withdrawal operations, these elite troops now find themselves tasked with holding territory, a role for which they are neither equipped nor prepared. This shift in operational focus has left many feeling forgotten and abandoned in the field, leading to a sense of disillusionment and frustration.
Compounding this issue is the perception among Gorgor soldiers that they are being targeted for their alleged loyalty to former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. This sentiment, coupled with the belief that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government wants to “finish off” Gorgor and the Eritrea-trained troops, has further eroded morale and contributed to a growing sense of mistrust and resentment within the ranks.
Morale in Freefall: Forgotten, Abandoned, and Targeted
The combination of heavy losses, low morale, and a sense of being targeted has given rise to a culture of desertion and mutiny within the Somali National Army (SNA). In the past three months alone, the 17th and 18th Brigades have lost 510 and 847 men, respectively, to desertions. This staggering rate of attrition underscores the severity of the problem and the failure of the SNA’s “Fakad Celin” policy, which involves reintegrating deserters after a three-month period back at camp.
The consequences of this desertion epidemic were laid bare in August 2023, when nearly 4,000 forces abandoned their positions in Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle, ceding hard-fought territory to Al-Shabab. In response, President Hassan Sheikh attempted to appease Gorgor by appointing their commander, Dayah Abdi Abdulle, as the Commander of the Land Forces of the SNA. The deserting units were given leave, retrained, and redeployed in December 2023, reclaiming some coastal areas but leaving the interior to Al-Shabab.
However, this move appears to have been insufficient to stem the tide of desertions. In a worrying development, new commanders appointed in the past two months have been instructed not to implement Fakad Celin. While the reasons for this decision remain unclear, some sources suggest that it may be an attempt to accommodate and integrate UAE-trained forces, for whom the government lacks sufficient funds, into Gorgor. Others, however, argue that Gorgor is primarily composed of new recruits and that Türkiye is unlikely to accept such an arrangement.
Leadership in Question: Accusations of Cowardice and Command Failures
The high rate of desertions and the perceived lack of effectiveness of Gorgor troops on the battlefield have led to accusations of cowardice from local Macawisley militias. In a particularly damning incident during the battle of Caad, where Gorgor was defeated by Al-Shabab, a Macawisley commander claimed that the special forces “ran from 40 men while having a strength of 1,500.” The Macawisley reportedly begged Gorgor not to leave their vehicles behind, with some being saved by the militia and others abandoned on the battlefield.
This perceived lack of bravery and effectiveness is attributed, in part, to the absence of experienced commanders at all levels within Gorgor. Many of these leaders have been lost to death or desertion, leaving a vacuum of expertise and guidance. A Gorgor source points to command-related problems as the biggest issue facing the unit, accusing the Chief of the Defense Forces, General Ibrahim Sheikh Muhudin, of being a “yes-man” who accepts impossible orders and deploys the commando forces as holding units rather than in their intended role of clearing operations.
The source also criticizes Colonel Dayah, the former Gorgor commander now heading the Land Forces, for not looking out for his men. This lack of strong, competent leadership has led to a decline in discipline and professionalism among Gorgor troops, with a Macawisley source describing them as “mostly marijuana smokers, drinkers, and prone to shootouts amongst themselves.”
Implications for the Fight Against Al-Shabab
The challenges facing Gorgor special forces have far-reaching implications for President Hassan Sheikh’s stated goal of defeating Al-Shabab in Somalia. As the elite unit tasked with spearheading the fight against the terrorist group, Gorgor’s effectiveness is crucial to the success of the government’s strategy. However, the current state of the unit, plagued by desertions, low morale, and leadership failures, raises serious doubts about its ability to fulfill this role.
The loss of experienced commanders and the high rate of attrition within Gorgor’s ranks have left the unit weakened and vulnerable. This, in turn, has allowed Al-Shabab to exploit the situation, reclaiming territory and strengthening its position in the face of a diminished and demoralized adversary. If left unchecked, this trend could lead to further setbacks and undermine the government’s efforts to establish control and stability in the region.
Moreover, the perception that Gorgor soldiers are being targeted for their alleged loyalty to Somalia’s former President Farmaajo risks politicizing the unit and eroding its cohesion and effectiveness. In a country where clan dynamics and political allegiances often trump national interests, such divisions within the military could prove disastrous, hampering coordination and cooperation in the fight against Al-Shabab.
The Way Forward: Addressing the Crisis in Gorgor
To address the multifaceted challenges facing Gorgor special forces, the Somali government and military leadership must take decisive action on several fronts. First and foremost, efforts must be made to boost morale and address the sense of abandonment and betrayal felt by many Gorgor soldiers. This can be achieved through improved communication, ensuring that troops are well-informed about their mission and the government’s support for their efforts.
Additionally, steps must be taken to address the underlying factors contributing to desertions, such as the perception that Gorgor soldiers are being targeted for their alleged loyalties to the former president. The government must work to foster a sense of unity and common purpose within the military, emphasizing the importance of national interests over political or clan affiliations.
Leadership must also be a key focus of reform efforts. The appointment of competent, experienced commanders who can inspire and guide their troops effectively is essential to rebuilding discipline, professionalism, and effectiveness within Gorgor. These leaders must be empowered to make decisions based on military necessity rather than political considerations, and they must be held accountable for the performance and conduct of their units.
Finally, the government of Somalia must reevaluate its strategy for the fight against Al-Shabab, taking into account the current state of Gorgor and other military units. This may require a reassessment of priorities, a reallocation of resources, and a more nuanced approach that takes into account the complex social, political, and economic factors fueling the conflict.
A Crucial Moment for Somalia’s Security
The crisis facing Gorgor special forces represents a critical moment for Somalia’s security and the government’s efforts to defeat Al-Shabab. If left unaddressed, the issues of desertions, low morale, and leadership failures within the unit could have devastating consequences, undermining the fight against the terrorist group and plunging the country into further instability.
However, if the government and military leadership can rise to the challenge and implement the necessary reforms, there is hope for a stronger, more effective Gorgor and a more successful campaign against Al-Shabab. By addressing the underlying causes of the current crisis and fostering a sense of unity, professionalism, and purpose within the military, Somalia can lay the foundation for a more stable and secure future.
