Mogadishu, Somalia – Hussein Sheikh-Ali, also known as Hussein Moalim, the National Security Advisor to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, stated during a Twitter Spaces session last night that all forces from Ethiopia will be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of 2024. This announcement has sparked concerns about the Somali government’s approach to regional security and diplomacy.
In the Twitter Spaces session on 31 May 2024, Hussein Moalim claimed that with the conclusion of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 31 December 2024, all Ethiopian forces would leave the country. However, this stance appears to be inconsistent with the realities on the ground and at odds with the Somali government’s past actions and statements.
Hussein Moalim made a subsequent assertion that Ethiopia cannot be considered ally as long as they interfere in Somali affairs, apparently referring to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland. This stance, echoed by President Hassan Sheikh himself, who has suggested that Ethiopia is Somalia’s “first enemy” and hinted at potential territorial claims, risks undermining regional stability and jeopardizing the fight against the Al-Shabab terrorist group.
The Somali Government’s Inconsistent Approach to ATMIS Withdrawal
The Somali government’s stance on the withdrawal of ATMIS forces, and particularly Ethiopian troops, has been marked by inconsistency and mixed messaging. In December 2022, Hussein Moalim made a last-minute appeal to the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) to delay the first phase of the withdrawal of 2,000 AU troops from Somalia, citing a lack of readiness. This request came despite the Somali authorities having previously pushed for the AU to adhere to the agreed-upon timeline.
The situation became even more embarrassing in September 2023, when the Somali government, led by its negotiations team headed by Hussein Moalim, not only asked the African Union Peace and Security Council to proceed with the withdrawal of 3,000 troops in the second phase but also demanded the removal of an additional 851 ATMIS police officers that were not even on the agenda. However, just five days later, Hussein Moalim sent a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council, copying in the Chairman of the African Union Commission, requesting a three-month delay in the withdrawal. This abrupt reversal not only undermined the Somali government’s credibility but also humiliated the AU, as they were not informed of the request beforehand. While the extension was eventually granted, it came at the cost of straining the relationship between the Somali government and the AU.
Ethiopia’s Role in Somalia’s Security
The Somali government’s demand for the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian forces by the end of 2024 appears to be disconnected from the realities on the ground. Ethiopia currently maintains more than 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of ATMIS, and thousands of additional troops in the country on a bilateral basis. These forces play a crucial role in providing security in key regions of south and central Somalia, including Hiran, Bay, Bakool, and Gedo, which are vital to Ethiopia’s own national security interests.
The Ethiopian presence in Somalia is not merely a matter of regional cooperation but a strategic necessity for Ethiopia to protect its homeland from the threat of Al-Shabab and other terrorist groups operating in the region. The Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and towns where Ethiopian troops are stationed serve as a buffer zone and a first line of defense against the spread of extremism and instability across the border. It is highly unlikely that Ethiopia would agree to withdraw its forces from these critical locations simply at the request of the Somali government, especially given the current security situation in Somalia.
Moreover, the Somali government’s own limited military capabilities and its struggling campaign against Al-Shabab raise serious doubts about its ability to fill the security vacuum that would be created by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. The Somali National Army (SNA) has made some progress in recent years, but it remains heavily dependent on international support and is not yet in a position to take full responsibility for the country’s security. The premature withdrawal of Ethiopian troops could therefore have disastrous consequences for Somalia’s stability and could potentially undo the hard-fought gains made against Al-Shabab in recent years.
Ethiopia’s Regional Influence and the FGS’s Limited Leverage
The Somali government’s demand for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces also fails to take into account Ethiopia’s significant regional influence and the limited diplomatic leverage of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS’s previous attempts to assert its authority over regional states, such as its failed bid to close Ethiopian consulates in Hargeisa and Garowe, have highlighted the limits of its power and the challenges it faces in enforcing its decisions.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, has a long history of involvement in Somalia and maintains close ties with various regional actors, including the governments of Somaliland and Puntland. The signing of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the visit of Puntland officials to Addis Ababa, which have both drawn the ire of the Somali government, is a clear indication of Ethiopia’s willingness to pursue its own interests in the region, even if it means going against the wishes of the FGS.
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s role in ATMIS and its bilateral security arrangements with Somalia are not solely dependent on the approval of the FGS. The African Union and the international community as a whole recognize the critical importance of Ethiopia’s contribution to regional security and stability. It is therefore highly likely that Ethiopia would find international support for its continued presence in Somalia, even if it were to operate outside the ATMIS framework and at its own expense.
Looking Forward
In conclusion, Hussein Moalim’s announcement regarding the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia by the end of 2024 underscores the complex and often contradictory nature of regional security dynamics. While the Somali government’s call for a complete withdrawal aligns with its desire to assert sovereignty and address internal grievances, it overlooks the significant role Ethiopia plays in maintaining stability in Somalia. Ethiopia’s long-standing involvement and strategic interests in Somalia, exemplified by its bilateral security arrangements and close ties with regional actors like Somaliland and Puntland, highlight its indispensability in the fight against Al-Shabab and other terrorist threats.
The actions and statements of Hussein Moalim, alongside the Somali government’s inconsistent approach to ATMIS and regional diplomacy, reflect the broader challenges of the FGS in navigating regional politics and securing international support. As Ethiopia continues to pursue its interests, often at odds with the FGS, it is evident that any future security framework must account for the realities on the ground and the web of alliances and rivalries in the Horn of Africa.
