Mogadishu, SOMALIA – Hussein Sheikh-Ali, also known as Hussein Moalim, the National Security Advisor (NSA) to Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, made statements during an interview with Universal TV that have sparked a heated debate about the complex dynamics of regional relations and security arrangements in Somalia. His characterization of the consulates of Ethiopia in Garowe and Hargeisa as the result of an occupation, along with his thinly veiled threat against Ethiopian forces remaining in the country beyond December 2024, have raised concerns about the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) approach to foreign military presence and regional engagement.
The Disconnect Between the FGS and Regional States
Hussein Moalim’s assertions about the Ethiopian consulates in Garowe and Hargeisa expose a significant disconnect between the FGS and the regional states of Puntland and Somaliland. The NSA’s admission that he does not know whether these consulates are still operational, despite his high-ranking position, raises serious questions about the FGS’s ability to effectively monitor and engage with developments in these crucial regions. This lack of situational awareness undermines the government’s credibility and highlights the limitations of its control and influence beyond Mogadishu.
The disconnect between the FGS and regional states is further exacerbated by the ongoing tensions and mistrust between the central government and the administrations in Puntland and Somaliland. The FGS’s failure to establish a constructive and inclusive dialogue with these regions has hindered progress towards a coherent and unified approach to national security and governance. The NSA’s controversial statements risk further alienating these regional stakeholders and undermining efforts to build a more collaborative and effective security apparatus.
Moreover, the FGS’s apparent lack of knowledge about the status of the Ethiopian consulates in Garowe and Hargeisa raises concerns about its ability to effectively engage with regional and international partners. These consulates have been a point of contention and a symbol of Ethiopia’s influence in these regions, and their presence has significant implications for the delicate balance of power and the ongoing dialogue between the FGS and the regional states. By displaying a lack of awareness about such a crucial matter, the NSA risks eroding trust and confidence in the FGS’s ability to navigate these complex regional dynamics and forge a coherent and inclusive national agenda.
The Complex Realities of Ethiopian Presence in Somalia
Hussein Moalim’s characterization of the Ethiopian presence in Somalia after December 2024 as an occupation, and his implied threat that they will be dealt with as occupiers, reveals a simplistic and potentially counterproductive approach to the complex realities on the ground. While the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which includes Ethiopian forces, is set to expire in December 2024, the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia extends far beyond this specific mission.
Ethiopian forces are currently deployed in more than a dozen towns across south and central Somalia, where they have been actively engaged in the fight against Al-Shabab and working to protect their own national interests. These deployments are often in coordination with and enjoy the support of local forces, highlighting the intricate web of security arrangements and alliances that exist beyond the direct control of the FGS. The NSA’s failure to acknowledge these realities and the importance of Ethiopian support in the fight against Al-Shabab demonstrates a lack of understanding of the complex security landscape in Somalia.
Furthermore, the FGS’s rhetoric against Ethiopian presence fails to take into account the limited capacity and capabilities of Somalia’s own security forces. In the absence of a strong and professional national army, the FGS relies heavily on the support of regional and international partners, including Ethiopia, to maintain stability and combat the persistent threat of terrorism. Alienating these partners without a clear and viable alternative strategy could have severe consequences for Somalia’s security and further undermine the government’s ability to protect its citizens.
The Risks of Alienating Regional Allies
The NSA’s implied threat against Ethiopian forces remaining in Somalia after December 2024 not only risks alienating a key regional ally but also exposes the limitations of the FGS’s ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of foreign military presence within its borders. Ethiopia has been a crucial partner in the fight against Al-Shabab and has played a significant role in supporting the FGS’s efforts to establish a more stable and secure environment in Somalia.
However, the FGS’s confrontational stance towards Ethiopia, as evidenced by Hussein Moalim’s statements, risks damaging this important relationship and undermining the progress made in recent years. By characterizing Ethiopian presence as an occupation and threatening to deal with them as occupiers, the NSA is effectively questioning Ethiopia’s commitment to Somalia’s security and stability, despite the sacrifices made by Ethiopian troops in the fight against Al-Shabab.
Moreover, the FGS’s aggressive rhetoric against Ethiopian presence fails to recognize the potential consequences of a premature withdrawal of foreign forces from Somalia. In the absence of a capable and self-sufficient Somali security apparatus, the sudden removal of Ethiopian troops could create a dangerous security vacuum that Al-Shabab and other extremist groups could exploit. This could lead to a resurgence of violence and instability, undermining the fragile gains made in recent years and putting the lives of Somali citizens at risk.
