With the continued drawdown of peacekeeping forces serving with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the Somali National Army (SNA) faces the ongoing need to take over responsibility for Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and their surrounding areas. However, the SNA continues to face several shortcomings and challenges that threaten its ability to perform this role.
The Issue of Logistics
One of the key deficiencies remains logistics. In the absence of support from ATMIS, the SNA continues to have limited ability to reliably provide supplies, equipment, and reinforcement along both Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and secondary roads.
During the Somalia Security Conference held on December 12, 2023, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, participants highlighted this issue. They recognized the need to provide continued logistical support, including equipment, maintenance, and management, among the three options for post-ATMIS support of the ongoing operational needs of Somali Security Forces (SSF). These options are: (1) SSF taking sole responsibility for security in Somalia; (2) ongoing Bilateral Support for SF-led operations along with the protection of key infrastructure and urban centers; and (3) a new Multilateral Mentorship Mission (AMISOM/ATMIS v.3.0).
Ongoing support will be particularly acute if the security environment evolves into the High-Risk Scenario outlined in the Scenarios and Options document produced by the conference in which, (1) 60% of the country is under government control; (2) al-Shabaab continues to hold areas; (3) al-Shabaab poses an ongoing threat to the population; and (4) MSRs remain ‘somewhat inaccessible.’
Al-Shabaab fighters continue to use IEDs to impede the movement of SNA and ATMIS convoys transporting soldiers, fuel, and supplies along MSRs and secondary roads. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, there was “no significant or sustainable change in improvised explosive device activity in 2023, compared with 2022.” Between 8 February to 7 June 2023, this included a total of 61 IED attacks, which was followed by 255 incidents between 8 June to 5 October 2023.
The Armored Assets of the Somali National Army
Before the final collapse of the Said Barre regime, the SNA possessed a little over 760 tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles. These included main battle tanks (M47, T-54/55, T-34, and Centurion), light tanks (M41), armored scout cars (BRDM-2 and AML-90), and a mix of tracked and wheeled armored personnel carriers (BTR-40/BTR-50/BTR-60/BTR-70, BTR-15,2 Fiat 6614 and 6616, BMR-600).
As of the start of 2022 the SNA possessed over 120 armored personnel carriers (38+ BTR type; 25+ AT-105 Saxon APCs; 13 Bastion APC; Fiat 6614 APCs), and 12 ‘Baoji Tiger’ 4×4 Armored Utility Variant mine-resistant light armored vehicles. Of even greater utility are the approximately 36 ‘Protected Patrol Vehicles’ (18+: Casspir; IVECO MAV-5; 9+ Kirpi (1; 2); 9+ Mamba Mk5, RG-31 Nyala, and the Qatari-made ‘Storm’) which offer significantly greater protection from attack by an improvised explosive device (IED).
At this time, the number of these vehicles that remain in service is unknown. On 24 December 2023, the al-Shabaab affiliated al-Kata’ib Media Foundation released a video of a battle that took place near Camaara (Harardheere District, Mudug Region) which showed a captured Qatari-made ‘Storm’ APCsr. Earlier in August 2023, another four ‘Storm’ APCs were destroyed when al-Shabaab fighters inflicted a heavy defeat on a ‘Gorgor’ commando force in the Galguduud Region.
Continued SNA Reliance on Unarmored Vehicles
However, while operating over 150 armoured vehicles of various types, the SNA remains vulnerable to the use of IEDs. While ‘Danab’ and ‘Gorgor’ commando forces have access to modern APCs and MRAPs, regular SNA forces continue to rely on light-skinned unarmored trucks and utility vehicles, the latter predominantly as ‘technical’ fighting vehicles mounted with 12.7mm or 14.5mm heavy machine guns.
Although the SNA has continued to receive training in logistics and supply-chain management, the wide variety of vehicle types presents an ongoing challenge. As such, any donation of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles operated by ATMIS, such as the Chinese-manufactured WZ-551, M36 ‘Puma’ or ‘Cougar’ MRAP, will only add to this problem.
In light of the SNA’s challenges, advocating for international support in standardizing their vehicle types is imperative. The varied fleet poses logistical and operational obstacles, hindering effective counter-insurgency efforts. A standardized vehicle approach ensures streamlined logistics, simplifies maintenance, and enhances troop mobility, crucial elements for success in the evolving security landscape.
International backing for this standardization initiative not only strengthens the SNA’s operational capabilities but fosters a more cohesive and efficient response to ongoing threats. The harmonization of vehicle types represents a tangible investment in stabilizing the region, supporting Somalia’s pursuit of sustainable security and self-reliance.
