In an unusually pointed intervention, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs took to X today to caution Somalia’s Federal Government against forging ahead with sweeping constitutional and electoral changes absent the support of Puntland and Jubaland. Quote-tweeting the presidency’s celebratory announcement of the National Consultative Conference (NCC) outcomes—including recognition of SSC-Khatumo as a federal member state—the Bureau warned that “decisions taken without broad-based support will lack legitimacy and distract from pressing security challenges.”
That rebuke lands amid a resurgence of Al-Shabab across Somalia’s strategic heartland. Just weeks ago, the insurgent group overran the Wargaadhi air-force base and routed government garrisons in Adan Yabaal, exposing gaps in both military capacity and political cohesion. As Mogadishu pursues federal reorganization, its security forces confront an enemy bold enough to encircle the capital itself. Without an inclusive national framework, analysts fear, the NCC’s decisions—even if well-meaning—could undermine the fragile alliance needed to hold Al-Shabab at bay.
A Fractured Conference
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud opened the NCC on May 5 with high hopes of charting a unified course to elections and federal stability. Over two days of sessions at Villa Somalia, select FMS leaders and the FGS deliberated on electoral timetables and forming a new political party. The climax came when Mogadishu formally recognized SSC-Khatumo—territories long contested by Puntland and Somaliland—as Somalia’s newest federal member state.
Yet conspicuous by their absence were the delegations of Puntland and Jubaland. Both regions have withheld recognition of constitutional amendments pushed through by Mogadishu without proper consultation. Puntland leaders insist the original 2012 charter must be fully reinstated before they will reengage in federal processes, while Jubaland remains embittered by a failed federal military operation that was launched against it by Mogadishu. By sidelining these major stakeholders, the NCC departed from the inclusive principle the president himself had championed—inviting criticism that its outcomes reflect Mogadishu’s will more than a genuine, broad-based consensus.
The U.S.’s public warning thus served as both a reminder and a rebuke: federal reforms lacking input from two of Somalia’s largest regions risk alienating the very authorities whose cooperation is essential for implementing any new constitutional or electoral framework.
Al-Shabab’s Renewed Offensive
As political leaders wrangle over statehood and ballot rules, Al-Shabab fighters exploit the vacuum. In late April, a mere 100 insurgents used suicide vehicle-borne IEDs and small-unit tactics to shatter a 3,000-strong Somali National Army (SNA) and Macawisley force in Adan Yabaal. Days later, militants stormed Wargaadhi, briefly seizing the fledgling air-force headquarters with minimal resistance. These victories connect to a broader pattern: the insurgents have steadily reclaimed territory in Lower and Middle Shabelle, reestablishing a corridor that threatens both Mogadishu’s supply routes and the city’s hinterland.
In response, the African Union and Somalia reversed their planned ATMIS drawdown, deciding to deploy 8,000 additional troops to bolster AUSSOM forces. This abrupt policy U-turn underscores the failure of previous transition efforts, which left Somali forces under-equipped and politically fragmented. The insurgents’ ability to seize well-fortified bases reveals not simply military weakness, but also the corrosive effect of federal-regional discord on operational cohesion. Without unified command structures or shared intelligence, SNA units and AU contingents have struggled to mount coordinated defenses.
Against this backdrop, the NCC’s focus on federal reorganization appears perilously untethered from the immediate security crisis. Political energies directed at constitutional tweaks risk detracting from the urgent, collaborative measures needed to reclaim and hold lost ground. The U.S. Bureau’s intervention thus carried an implicit injunction: mend the political fissures or watch Al-Shabab exploit them further.
