In a dramatic policy U-turn, the African Union and Somali government agreed to reinforce the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM, formerly ATMIS) with 8,000 additional troops, reversing a planned drawdown that began in 2022. The decision comes after coordinated Al-Shabab offensives recaptured swathes of Lower and Middle Shabelle, exposing gaps in Somalia’s security architecture and marking the most serious setback in AUSSOM’s three-year transition mandate.
When ATMIS replaced AMISOM in April 2022, its twin goals were clear: bolster Somali forces against Al-Shabab while steadily handing security responsibilities back to Mogadishu. Instead, ATMIS contingents—peaking at roughly 20,000 uniformed personnel—found themselves propping up overstretched Somali National Army (SNA) units rather than mentoring them. Equipment shortages, from armored vehicles to air-lift capacity, forced AU troops into sustained front-line duties, diverting resources away from training and institution-building.
Al-Shabab’s Rapid Counter-Offensive
Since January, Al-Shabab militants have exploited these vulnerabilities with surgical precision. Small units—often no more than 100 fighters—employed suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) and nighttime raids to rout larger SNA garrisons at Adan Yabaal and Wargaadhi. By seizing key river crossings and ambushing supply convoys along the Mogadishu–Balcad road, they effectively choked government logistics. As bases fell one by one, from forward posts to the fledgling Wargaadhi air-force headquarters, the insurgents reestablished a contiguous zone of control stretching through Middle Shabelle—terrain previously secured in the 2022 offensive.
Al-Shabab’s battlefield successes have been matched by adept propaganda, with militants broadcasting footage of their fighters raising banners over retaken towns. These victories have sapped morale among SNA troops and fueled recruitment in contested areas, further tipping the balance in the insurgents’ favor.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and AUSSOM leadership endorsed a plan to inject 8,000 additional personnel into AUSSOM.
Political and Military Failures Fuel the Crisis
Yet the decision to reinvest in foreign troops could have been averted had Somalia’s leaders prioritized unity and force readiness over divisive politics. Over the past two years, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has devoted unprecedented time and attention to unilateral constitutional reforms and high-stakes power plays with Puntland and Jubaland. By sidelining key regional governments, he fractured the very federal cooperation that ATMIS was meant to hand security back to. Consequently, when Al-Shabab mounted its latest offensives, the Somali National Army (SNA) found itself fighting on multiple fronts without the regional reinforcements it needed.
On the military side, deficiencies in command and control also compounded the problem. The withdrawal of ATMIS in late 2024 left numerous SNA outposts operating without robust communications or joint-logistics frameworks. Smaller Al-Shabab units exploited these gaps with lightning raids, concentrating firepower on isolated garrisons before federal forces could muster reinforcements. Without clear rules of engagement or rapid-reaction reserves, Somali commanders were forced into reactive defense, relinquishing hard-won territory across Middle and Lower Shabelle.
In hindsight, the very posture that President Hassan Sheikh championed—“Not stopping for anyone”—became emblematic of strategic overreach. By pursuing constitutional and political ambitions ahead of shoring up the army’s backbone, the administration ceded initiative to Al-Shabab. Now, on the brink of yet another foreign troop surge, Somalia faces a stark choice: reform its fractured politics and fully equip its own soldiers, or remain trapped in a cycle of dependence that undermines both its sovereignty and long-term stability.
