Today morning, Al-Shabaab launched yet another calculated and devastating strike—this time against the Somali National Army (SNA) base in Wargaadhi, a location of both strategic and symbolic importance in the Cadale district of Middle Shabelle. Officially designated in December 2023 as the headquarters of Somalia’s fledgling air force, the base was swiftly overrun after a well-coordinated attack involving a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) and follow-on assaults by insurgents from multiple directions. Initial reports indicate the militants entered from the northeast and northwest, facing minimal resistance. They withdrew after briefly holding it.
What unfolded at Wargaadhi is but part of an unmistakable pattern: a string of battlefield defeats and territorial losses that point to an accelerating collapse of federal military capacity in the country’s central belt. Wargaadhi’s fall underscores not only the fragility of the Somali state but also the rapid unraveling of the modest gains made since the 2022 anti-Al-Shabaab offensive.
The base at Wargaadhi was envisioned as a launchpad for a new air force, a rare institutional investment meant to signal the resurgence of national sovereignty and military professionalism. Its loss within such a short span demonstrates the hollowness of that ambition and the absence of a durable security strategy capable of withstanding sustained insurgent pressure.
Moreover, this development adds to a cascade of losses that have steadily eroded the credibility of the Somali Federal Government’s military posture. Since the controversial constitutional reforms of March 2024, federal forces have suffered defeats across the country. Taken together, these defeats have created a growing zone of militant control that stretches from Hiraan through Middle Shabelle and beyond—effectively eliminating the federal military’s ability to project power or ensure stability in these areas.
The Somali Security Forces (SSF) have shown themselves incapable of holding ground in the face of concerted militant attacks. While overstretched and lacking in resources, the deeper issue lies in political misprioritization and strategic incoherence. The focus of the federal administration under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has veered away from national cohesion and battlefield coordination, and toward centralization of political authority through unilateral constitutional amendments, public confrontations with Federal Member States (FMS), and repeated attempts to marginalize key regional actors.
This misalignment of priorities has undermined both trust and functionality within Somalia’s fragile federal structure. Puntland’s withdrawal from cooperation with the Federal Government in response to constitutional overreach, and Jubaland’s active military resistance to Mogadishu’s political interference, have fractured the already fragile framework of national unity. In this vacuum, Hirshabelle—where Wargaadhi lies—has been left defenseless, revealing the full extent of the federal government’s political and military disengagement from frontline regions.
Erosion of Federal Military Capacity
The operational implications of losing Wargaadhi are severe. Its brief loss reduces the strategic depth protecting the capital and opens up supply and maneuver corridors that allow Al-Shabaab to consolidate and redistribute forces with relative ease. In effect, Somalia is witnessing the reconstitution of insurgent mobility and territorial dominance that it had briefly suppressed in the wake of the 2022 campaign.
Al-Shabaab’s resurgence has been both deliberate and effective. In each attack—Adan Yabaal and now Wargaadhi—they have deployed relatively small but highly motivated units to outmaneuver, displace, and overwhelm far larger but demoralized SNA garrisons. These operations have exposed the absence of meaningful intelligence integration, insufficient aerial surveillance, and a command structure crippled by political interference and lack of autonomy.
Moreover, the militants have increasingly used Middle Shabelle as an operational staging ground for attacks designed to encircle Mogadishu. With the fall of Wargaadhi, the road to the capital grows shorter, and the threats to the capital more imminent. Intelligence sources warn of a heightened likelihood of further coordinated attacks along both northern and southern axes, a grim indication that Al-Shabaab is planning not merely to harass, but to paralyze the Somali state from its core.
The idea that federal forces can sustain a protracted counter-insurgency without full national cohesion is no longer credible. Somalia’s security collapse is not due solely to lack of training or material, but rather to a structural political failure to unify the country’s leadership around a coherent security doctrine.
The gap between political rhetoric and operational reality has grown dangerously wide. President Hassan Sheikh’s slogan, “Loo Joojin Mayo” (“Not stopping for anyone”), once a rallying cry for momentum against terror, now rings hollow. His administration’s attempt to rule through central decree while ignoring the legitimate concerns of FMS has led to a political isolation that mirrors the battlefield defeats suffered by his security forces. Every base lost is not just a military failure, but a symptom of a deeper legitimacy crisis.
