The election of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, popularly known as “Cirro,” as the new President of the breakaway northwest regions of Somalia known as Somaliland has the potential to significantly impact the region’s conflicts and diplomatic relations. As the self-declared republic prepares for a transfer of power from outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi, observers are closely watching to see how the new administration will approach key issues such as the frozen war with the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn – Khatumo (SSC-K) and the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year.
President-elect Abdirahman Cirro’s background and political stance suggest that he may bring a fresh perspective to these challenges, potentially altering the dynamics of the region’s ongoing struggles and reshaping Somaliland’s relationships with its neighbors and the international community. However, the extent to which he will depart from the policies of his predecessor remains uncertain, as the new leader must navigate an array of political, economic, and security interests while also managing the expectations of Somaliland’s diverse constituencies.
A Rejection of Militarism and Unilateralism?
The outcome of Somaliland’s presidential election can be seen as a rejection of the confrontational and militaristic approach adopted by outgoing President Muse Bihi, particularly in relation to the SSC-K conflict and the pursuit of international recognition through unilateral agreements like the Ethiopia MoU. Bihi’s hardline stance on these issues, exemplified by his refusal to stop the shelling of Las Anod by Somaliland forces, may have ultimately cost him the presidency, as voters grew weary of the human and economic costs of the frozen war and the diplomatic fallout from the MoU.
Abdirahman Cirro, in contrast, is seen as a less militaristic figure, unlike Muse Bihi who was a former colonel in the Somali army. His origins in the Sanaag region, which is claimed by both Somaliland and SSC-K, have also led some to perceive him as more sympathetic to the latter’s cause, raising hopes for a possible thaw in relations between the two sides. If Cirro proves willing to engage in dialogue and compromise with SSC-K, it could pave the way for a more peaceful and stable resolution to the long-running conflict, which has claimed countless lives and hindered development in the territories.
However, it is important to note that Abdirahman Cirro’s election does not necessarily represent a fundamental shift in Somaliland’s political orientation or a rejection of its secessionist aspirations. While he may adopt a more conciliatory approach to the SSC-K conflict, Cirro is unlikely to abandon Somaliland’s ultimate goal of international recognition and statehood, which remains a central pillar of the region’s political identity and national narrative.
The MoU Question
Perhaps the most significant and contentious issue facing President-elect Abdirahman Cirro is the fate of the MoU signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which grants the latter part of Somaliland’s sea in exchange for economic and political support. The agreement, which was championed by President Bihi as a means of securing international recognition for Somaliland, has been met with fierce opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and other regional actors, who view it as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Abdirahman Cirro’s stance on the MoU will be a key indicator of his foreign policy priorities and his approach to the question of Somaliland’s relationship with the rest of Somalia. On the one hand, the President-elect has expressed a greater openness to dialogue and engagement with the FGS than his predecessor, suggesting that he may be willing to explore a more cooperative and less confrontational path to resolving the status of Somaliland. This could involve a renegotiation or even a repudiation of the Ethiopia MoU, in exchange for concessions or guarantees from the FGS regarding Somaliland’s autonomy and political rights.
On the other hand, Cirro is a committed secessionist who has repeatedly affirmed his belief in Somaliland’s right to self-determination and statehood. As such, he may be reluctant to abandon the MoU entirely, seeing it as a valuable bargaining chip in Somaliland’s ongoing quest for international recognition. If Cirro chooses to continue pursuing the agreement, it could strain relations with the FGS and other regional actors, perpetuating the cycle of mistrust and antagonism that has characterized Somaliland’s interactions with the FGS in recent years.
Ultimately, the President-elect will need to carefully weigh the potential risks and rewards of different approaches to the MoU question, taking into account the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and the shifting priorities of key international partners. By charting a course that balances Somaliland’s aspirations for recognition with the need for regional stability and cooperation, Cirro may be able to unlock new opportunities for dialogue and compromise, while also safeguarding the interests of the people he represents.
