As Jubaland prepares to hold its long-awaited presidential elections tomorrow, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has once again resorted to its tired playbook of interference and destabilization in a desperate bid to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process. In a move that has been widely condemned as a blatant attempt to subvert the will of the people of Jubaland, the FGS is secretly supporting Ilyas Beddel Gaboose, a senator in the federal parliament, who claimed that he is now the President of Jubaland.
This latest act of political theater is a stark reminder of the FGS’s long history of meddling in the affairs of Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMS), and its relentless pursuit of a centralized and unitary system of governance that runs counter to the principles of federalism enshrined in the country’s constitution. From the armed militias it has sponsored in Puntland to the multiple pretenders it has backed in previous Jubaland elections, the FGS has consistently demonstrated its willingness to use any means necessary to install its loyalists in positions of power and undermine the autonomy of the FMS.
However, the FGS’s efforts to derail Jubaland’s electoral process are likely to prove as futile as they are misguided. Despite the noise and bluster emanating from Mogadishu, the reality on the ground in Jubaland tells a very different story. The state’s security forces and governance structures remain firmly under the control of the incumbent President Ahmed Madobe, who enjoys widespread popular support and has proven himself to be a formidable and resilient leader in the face of repeated challenges to his authority.
The FGS’s History of Meddling in Jubaland
To understand the current situation in Jubaland, it is important to situate it within the broader context of the FGS’s long history of interference in the state’s affairs. Perhaps the most egregious example of this interference occurred in 2013, during the first administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, when the FGS backed a series of pretenders to the Jubaland presidency in an attempt to oust Ahmed Madobe from power.
The ensuing conflict, which claimed the lives of dozens of civilians and combatants alike, was a stark demonstration of the FGS’s willingness to destabilize entire regions of the country in pursuit of its own narrow political interests. Despite the heavy cost in blood and treasure, however, the FGS’s efforts ultimately proved futile, as Madobe was able to rally his supporters and assert his authority as the legitimate leader of Jubaland.
Fast forward to the present day, and it appears that the FGS has learned little from its past mistakes. By throwing its weight behind Ilyas Beddel Gaboose, a relatively unknown and untested figure with no significant base of support in Jubaland, the FGS is once again attempting to impose its will on the state through a combination of political maneuvering and brute force.
However, the chances of this strategy succeeding are slim to none. Gaboose’s claim to the presidency is widely seen as a joke within Jubaland, and his candidacy has generated little enthusiasm or support among the state’s residents. Moreover, the security forces and governance structures that underpin Madobe’s authority remain firmly in place, making it virtually impossible for the FGS to dislodge him through political means alone.
The FGS’s Pursuit of Centralization and Control
The FGS’s interference in Jubaland’s electoral process is part of a broader pattern of behavior that has seen the federal government consistently seek to centralize power and control in Mogadishu at the expense of the FMS. This pursuit of a unitary system of governance, which runs counter to the principles of federalism enshrined in Somalia’s constitution, has been a recurring theme throughout the FGS’s tenure, and has been a major source of tension and conflict between the federal government and the FMS.
One of the most egregious examples of this centralizing tendency occurred in Puntland, where the FGS has repeatedly sought to interfere in the state’s electoral processes and undermine the authority of its democratically-elected leaders. In the run-up to Puntland’s most recent presidential elections, for example, the FGS was accused of arming local militias in an attempt to prevent the elections from taking place and make it harder for the incumbent president to be re-elected.
Despite these efforts, however, the FGS’s interference ultimately proved futile, as Puntland’s security forces were able to maintain control and ensure that the elections went ahead as planned. The incident served as a reminder of the limits of the FGS’s power and influence, and the resilience and determination of the FMS in the face of external threats to their autonomy and sovereignty.
Similar patterns of interference and destabilization have been observed in other FMS as well, from Galmudug to Hirshabelle to Southwest State. In each case, the FGS has sought to exploit local divisions and grievances in order to install its own loyalists in positions of power, often at the expense of the wishes and aspirations of the local population.
