Statements made by Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi at the Somali Diaspora Conference in Doha, Qatar, regarding Somalia’s alleged “defeat” of Ethiopian forces from 2006-2008 not only escalate tensions surrounding the contentious Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) but also reveal a troubling agenda aimed at undermining the very foundations of Somalia’s federal structure.
Fiqi’s claim that Somalia “defeated” 50,000 Ethiopian troops between 2006 and 2008 represents more than a mere distortion of historical facts—it is a deliberate attempt to delegitimize the very genesis of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). By framing Ethiopia’s intervention as an unprovoked invasion triggered by Somalia’s developmental progress, specifically the reopening of the airport and seaport, Fiqi is effectively casting the creation of the FGS itself as an act of foreign aggression. This narrative conveniently omits the critical context that Ethiopian forces entered Somalia at the request of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), with the explicit purpose of supporting its establishment in the capital.
The irony of Fiqi’s position is palpable, given that the current government he represents is a direct successor to the TFG, having evolved into the FGS in 2012. By attempting to delegitimize the TFG’s actions and, by extension, its international backing, Fiqi inadvertently calls into question the very basis of the current government’s authority. This paradoxical stance underscores a deeply held belief within the current administration that the federalist framework—the bedrock of both the TFG and the FGS—is fundamentally unacceptable.
The Roots of Anti-Federalism: Dam Jadiid and Aala Sheikh
To understand the profound contradictions inherent in Fiqi’s statements and the administration’s broader anti-federalist agenda, one must delve into the complex tapestry of Somalia’s political factions. The current administration in Mogadishu is largely composed of two intertwined groups: the Dam Jadiid (New Blood) wing of the Somali branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Islah, and the Aala Sheikh faction, which adheres to Sufi-Ikhwani beliefs. Both groups played significant roles in what they euphemistically term “the resistance” against the TFG and Ethiopian forces from December 2006 to 2008.
The Dam Jadiid faction, which includes key figures in the current government, was intricately linked to the Islamic Courts Union—the very entity that the TFG and Ethiopian forces sought to dislodge from Mogadishu. Similarly, the Aala Sheikh group, to which Fiqi himself belongs, was prominently involved in the armed opposition to the TFG in the capital. This historical context reveals a profound ideological disconnect: the very individuals who once fought against the legitimacy of the TFG now seek to wield its successor’s authority while simultaneously undermining its historical foundations and federal structure.
The administration’s anti-federalist stance and its thinly veiled hostility towards Puntland are two sides of the same coin. Puntland, which provided the core of the fighters to the TFG and whose President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, was elected President of the TFG in 2004, represents the embodiment of successful federalism in Somalia. By consistently sidelining Puntland and pushing for constitutional changes without broad consensus, the current administration in Mogadishu is actively seeking to dismantle the federal structure that Puntland helped establish.
By attempting to recast the period before the TFG’s establishment in Mogadishu as a time of positive development, Fiqi and his colleagues are effectively dismissing the legitimacy of Puntland’s efforts and the federal project as a whole.
The Specter of Al-Shabab
Perhaps most alarming in Fiqi’s narrative is the assertion that Ethiopian forces “created Al-Shabab in the process” of their intervention. This simplistic attribution not only absolves local actors of responsibility but also ignores the complex socio-political factors that contributed to Al-Shabab’s rise. It conveniently overlooks the role that elements within the Islamic Courts Union—from which many current government officials emerged—played in the genesis and early support of Al-Shabab.
This mischaracterization of Al-Shabab’s origins serves a dual purpose: to deflect blame onto external actors while simultaneously positioning the current administration as victims rather than participants in the group’s emergence. Such a narrative dangerously oversimplifies the multifaceted nature of Somalia’s political instability and the intricate web of responsibilities shared by various stakeholders in the country’s ongoing conflict.
Moreover, by focusing on external factors, the administration avoids addressing the internal contradictions and governance failures that have allowed Al-Shabab to persist and, in some cases, thrive. This deflection of responsibility undermines efforts to develop a comprehensive and effective strategy to combat extremism and build a stable federal state.
