The Black Lion is Dead

Mogadishu, SOMALIA – Since July 2022, Somalia has been steadfastly engaged in Phase 1 of the Liberation Operations, a critical initiative to bolster national security and counter the pervasive threat of Al-Shabab. This phase, originally designed as a foundational step in Somalia’s comprehensive security strategy, has unexpectedly extended for over 18 months. The prolonged engagement in Phase 1 underscores the significant challenges Somalia faces in stabilizing regions under threat and rooting out Al-Shabab militants. This extended duration has inadvertently affected the planning and execution timeline for Phase 2, the “Black Lion” operations, which aimed to broaden the scope of regional security efforts by including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti as frontline states.

The transition to “Black Lion” operations has been further complicated by a notable diplomatic fallout with Ethiopia, following its controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. This MoU, entailing Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland in exchange for sea access, has not only strained relations between Somalia and Ethiopia but also raised significant doubts about the feasibility of collaborative military efforts against Al-Shabab under the current circumstances. The combination of the protracted duration of Phase 1 and the diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia presents a complex challenge to advancing regional security operations and effectively countering Al-Shabab’s threat.

The agreement not only complicates the diplomatic landscape but also casts a long shadow over the prospects of Somalia and Ethiopia working together militarily against Al-Shabab. General Bariise, appointed to lead and coordinate the operations with the frontline states, underscored the severity of the situation by advocating for a popular uprising against the anticipated Ethiopian entry into Somaliland. This statement reflects the deep-seated tensions and the complexities of navigating such a fraught geopolitical terrain.

Implications for Somali-Ethiopian Military Cooperation

The notion of Somalia and Ethiopia collaborating militarily against Al-Shabab under the current circumstances seems increasingly unlikely, particularly impacting the strategic planning and execution of “Black Lion” operations. This initiative, envisioned as a key phase in the regional security strategy, finds itself at a crossroads due to the rift caused by the MoU with Somaliland. This rift goes beyond a mere diplomatic spat; it represents a fundamental realignment of regional alliances and strategic interests, casting a long shadow over the prospects of “Black Lion” and similar collaborative endeavors. Such a situation raises critical questions about the future of security operations in the region and the potential for effective collective action against common security threats. The discord between Somalia and Ethiopia, exacerbated by the MoU, could serve as a significant impediment to regional stability, potentially emboldening Al-Shabab and other extremist groups looking to exploit these geopolitical fissures.

Moreover, the implications of this fallout extend beyond the immediate security concerns. They touch upon the broader dynamics of Horn of Africa politics, where alliances are often fluid, and the geopolitical landscape is marked by a complex interplay of national interests, regional power struggles, and the overarching goal of combating terrorism and ensuring security. In this context, the strained Somali-Ethiopian relationship becomes a critical barometer for the health of regional cooperation and the prospects for sustained peace and security efforts, casting doubt on the future effectiveness of “Black Lion” and other critical operations aimed at securing the region.

The Path Forward

In light of these developments, the path forward for Somalia and Ethiopia, and indeed for the broader Horn of Africa region, requires careful navigation. The first step towards reconciling these challenges lies in addressing the underlying issues that have led to the current impasse. Diplomatic engagement, coupled with efforts to build mutual trust and understanding, will be essential in overcoming the obstacles posed by the MoU with Somaliland. Furthermore, the international community, particularly entities with vested interests in regional stability, such as the African Union and the United Nations, may need to play a more active role in facilitating dialogue and respect for each other’s territorial integrity.

Additionally, it is imperative for Somalia and its regional partners to explore alternative strategies for cooperation against Al-Shabab and other security threats. This may involve broadening the scope of collaboration to include other states in the region and beyond, who share a common interest in combating terrorism and securing peace. The resilience of regional security operations in the face of diplomatic challenges will be a testament to the collective will of the Horn of Africa nations to prioritize the safety and well-being of their citizens over geopolitical disputes.

In conclusion, the MoU fallout between Somalia and Ethiopia significantly challenges regional security cooperation and casts a shadow on “Black Lion” operations. Strained relations now jeopardize this critical phase aimed at bolstering defense collaboration between Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia. This rift highlights the intricate Somali-Ethiopian dynamics and the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Facing these challenges, the region must engage diplomatically, flex strategically, and renew its commitment to security efforts like “Black Lion.” Navigating these obstacles and fostering regional cooperation and stability become paramount to realizing initiatives that safeguard against threats like Al-Shabab.