The FGS has intensified its efforts to destabilize Jubaland, orchestrating defections within the state’s security forces and leveraging clan rivalries to weaken President Ahmed Madobe’s grip on power. At the same time, Jubaland, in a rare show of defiance, has aligned with Puntland to oppose the FGS’s controversial constitutional amendments, which many regard as a centralizing power grab.
The FGS’s Divide-and-Rule Tactics
The FGS’s manipulation of internal clan dynamics has been a hallmark of its strategy to assert control over Jubaland. In its latest gambit, Mogadishu orchestrated the defection of approximately 250 Jubaland security personnel—150 from Ras Kamboni and nearly 100 from Kulbiyow. These defectors, notably from smaller clans outside Madobe’s traditional support base, are now forming the foundation of a parallel security apparatus loyal to the central government.
This maneuver underscores the FGS’s intent to exploit Jubaland’s internal vulnerabilities to erode Madobe’s authority. The choice to target smaller clans is particularly shrewd; it taps into grievances about marginalization under Madobe’s Ogaden-dominated administration while simultaneously diminishing Jubaland’s ability to present a unified front against Mogadishu.
Historically, Jubaland has been a microcosm of Somalia’s broader clan-based governance challenges. While Madobe’s administration has leaned heavily on his subclan, the Rer Abdille of the Ogaden clan for support, the state is home to numerous smaller clans with distinct interests and limited representation. The FGS’s efforts to foster discontent within these marginalized groups are not without precedent. From backing opposition candidates in past Jubaland elections to deploying federal troops to contested territories, Mogadishu has repeatedly sought to undermine Jubaland’s autonomy through divide-and-rule strategies.
This approach, however, carries significant risks. While it may temporarily weaken Madobe’s administration, it also exacerbates clan tensions, destabilizing the region and making governance even more precarious. In the long term, the FGS’s tactics may create a volatile political landscape where mistrust and fragmentation become the norm, further complicating efforts to build a cohesive federal system.
Aligning Against Mogadishu’s Overreach
Jubaland’s response to Mogadishu’s provocations has been resolute. On Thursday, the state joined Puntland in rejecting constitutional amendments introduced unilaterally by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in March 2024. These amendments, enacted without broad regional consultation, have been criticized as undermining the principles of federalism by centralizing power in Mogadishu.
Jubaland’s alignment with Puntland represents a significant moment in Somalia’s federal dynamics. For years, the two regions have expressed parallel grievances about the FGS’s perceived overreach, yet this coordinated opposition signals a more unified regional resistance to Mogadishu’s centralizing agenda.
The constitutional amendments lie at the heart of this conflict. By altering key provisions related to executive powers, elections and regional autonomy, the changes have sparked fears that Mogadishu seeks to consolidate authority at the expense of federal member states. For Jubaland, these fears are amplified by the FGS’s history of undermining regional governance through military interventions, political interference, and now, defections within its security forces.
Jubaland’s defiance also reflects a broader distrust of Mogadishu’s intentions. Many in Jubaland view the constitutional changes as part of a wider pattern of authoritarianism that prioritizes central control over genuine federal cooperation. By standing alongside Puntland, Jubaland sends a clear message: the federal member states will not accept unilateral moves that compromise their autonomy and the federal balance.
Implications of the Jubaland Political Crisis
The escalating crisis is symptomatic of a deeper, systemic struggle between Somalia’s federal government and its semi-autonomous regions. At its core, this conflict revolves around competing visions for Somalia’s governance: a centralized state with strong executive powers versus a decentralized federation where regional authorities wield substantial autonomy.
The FGS’s actions in Jubaland illustrate its preference for the former. Through constitutional amendments, military interventions, and the manipulation of clan dynamics, Mogadishu has sought to assert dominance over its federal member states. While these moves may strengthen the central government in the short term, they risk alienating regional administrations, undermining trust, and destabilizing the entire federal system.
In Jubaland, these tensions are compounded by the state’s strategic importance. As a gateway to Kenya and a key player in regional counterterrorism efforts, Jubaland is a critical buffer zone against the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Any instability in Jubaland has ripple effects beyond Somalia’s borders, potentially jeopardizing regional security and international efforts to combat extremism.
Meanwhile, the FGS’s tactics in Jubaland resonate across other federal member states. Puntland, for example, has long clashed with Mogadishu over resource-sharing agreements and regional autonomy. The alignment of Jubaland and Puntland against the constitutional amendments marks a significant escalation in these disputes, highlighting the growing discontent among Somalia’s regions.
