Seven Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers and their driver were brutally executed near the town of El Baraf, in what appears to be a devastating consequence of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s controversial policy of arming clan militias to fight Al-Shabab.
The soldiers, who had been stationed in central Somalia and were passing through El Baraf on their way home to Hiran, were reportedly taken prisoner by members of the Abgaal clan, which has a long history of violent conflict with the Hawadle clan, from which President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mother hails. The fact that the soldiers were not only captured but also videotaped and executed in cold blood has sent a chilling message about the depths of clan animosity and the dangers of entrusting the fight against Al-Shabab to non-state actors.
This tragic incident is just the latest in a series of tit-for-tat attacks between the Abgaal and Hawadle clans, which have been engaged in a vicious cycle of retaliatory violence for generations. However, the targeting of government forces marks a disturbing escalation of the conflict and raises serious questions about the long-term viability of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, which has relied heavily on the use of clan militias to supplement the SNA’s efforts against Al-Shabab.
A Misguided Strategy
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s policy of arming clan militias to fight Al-Shabab has been controversial from the outset, with many experts warning that it could exacerbate existing tensions and create new opportunities for violence and instability. The president’s decision to rely on militias drawn from his own clan, the Abgaal, as well as his mother’s clan, the Hawadle, has been particularly problematic, given the long history of conflict and mistrust between these two groups.
The arming of these militias has not only fueled existing grievances and rivalries but has also created a dangerous parallel security structure that operates outside the formal chain of command and accountability mechanisms of the SNA. This has led to a situation in which clan loyalties and personal agendas often take precedence over national security priorities, with militias using their newfound power and resources to settle old scores and advance their own interests.
The consequences of this misguided strategy have been devastating, both for the communities caught in the crossfire of clan violence and for the SNA itself. The fact that seven soldiers could be captured and executed by a clan militia in broad daylight, without any apparent consequences or accountability, is a damning indictment of the government’s failure to assert its authority and maintain a monopoly on the use of force.
Moreover, the incident in El Baraf is likely to have a profoundly demoralizing effect on the SNA rank and file, who may now question the value of their sacrifices and the government’s commitment to their safety and well-being. The fact that the soldiers were targeted not by Al-Shabab but by a government-allied militia is a particularly bitter pill to swallow and could undermine the cohesion and effectiveness of the SNA as a fighting force.
Fueling the Cycle of Violence
The incident in El Baraf is part of a broader pattern of clan violence and retaliatory attacks that have plagued Somalia for decades. The country’s complex clan structure, in which loyalty to one’s family and lineage often trumps national identity or political affiliation, has long been a source of conflict and instability, with clans competing for power, resources, and influence at the local and national levels.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s policy of arming clan militias has only served to fuel this cycle of violence, by providing clans with the means and incentives to pursue their own agendas and settle old scores. The fact that the president has relied on militias drawn from his own clan and his mother’s clan has only heightened suspicions of favoritism and bias, further eroding trust in the government and its institutions.
The tit-for-tat nature of the violence between the Abgaal and Hawadle clans is an example of how clan rivalries can quickly spiral out of control, with each attack provoking a response and each response provoking further retaliation. In such a context, the introduction of government-supplied weapons and resources into the mix is like pouring gasoline on an already raging fire.
Moreover, the fact that Al-Shabab has been largely absent from the recent spate of violence between the Abgaal and Hawadle clans underscores the extent to which the government’s policy of arming clan militias has backfired. Rather than focusing their efforts on the common enemy of Al-Shabab, these militias have instead turned their weapons on each other, in a self-destructive cycle of violence that threatens to undermine the entire counter-terrorism effort.
