Mogadishu, SOMALIA – President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud convened on Thursday a meeting with his security and finance officials at Villa Somalia to discuss anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies. The primary focus of this high-level gathering was to address the persistent issue of Al-Shabab tax collection in Mogadishu. This meeting, however, stands in sharp contrast to the reality on the ground, where Al-Shabab’s extortion activities continue unabated, highlighting the significant challenges facing the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its efforts to establish full control over the capital.
The Persistence of Al-Shabab’s Shadow Economy
Despite repeated claims of progress in the fight against Al-Shabab, the group’s ability to maintain tax collection in Mogadishu represents a significant failure of government policy and security measures. The fact that this extortion network operates openly in the heart of the capital, supposedly under government control, raises serious questions about the effectiveness of current counter-terrorism strategies and the reach of state authority.
According to a Mogadishu-based businessman who spoke to The Somali Digest, the Al-Shabab tax collection in Mogadishu is not only ongoing but has become an accepted, if unwelcome, part of doing business in the city. This normalization of extortion payments to a terrorist organization in the capital city represents a dangerous erosion of state legitimacy and highlights the group’s deep entrenchment in the local economy.
The persistence of Al-Shabab’s shadow economy in Mogadishu is further exacerbated by the group’s sophisticated financial network. They have developed a complex system of revenue collection that goes beyond mere extortion, including investments in legitimate businesses and control over key economic sectors.
Moreover, Al-Shabab’s tax collection system often proves more efficient and predictable than the government’s, paradoxically providing a semblance of economic stability for some businesses. This perverse reliability undermines the government’s efforts to assert its authority and perpetuates a cycle of dependence on the terrorist group’s shadow economy.
The group’s ability to maintain these operations in Mogadishu also speaks to a level of social embeddedness that goes beyond mere coercion. Al-Shabab has, in some cases, positioned itself as an alternative provider of services and dispute resolution, filling gaps left by weak or corrupt government institutions.
The Rise of IS-Somalia in the Extortion Landscape
Compounding the challenge of Al-Shabab tax collection in Mogadishu is the emergence of the Islamic State in Somalia (IS-Somalia) as another player in the city’s extortion ecosystem. While their operations are reportedly on a smaller scale compared to Al-Shabab, the presence of a second extremist group engaging in these activities further complicates the security situation.
Interestingly, the businessman’s account suggests a shift in IS-Somalia’s tactics. Previously known for bombing businesses that refused to pay, the group has apparently ceased these attacks after securing annual payments. This evolution in approach indicates a level of pragmatism and adaptability among these extremist organizations, potentially making them even more difficult to dislodge from the economic fabric of the city.
The rise of IS-Somalia in Mogadishu’s extortion landscape introduces a new dynamic of competition between extremist groups. This rivalry could potentially lead to increased violence as groups vie for control over lucrative extortion territories. Alternatively, it might result in a form of criminal cooperation or division of areas of influence, further entrenching the shadow economy in the city’s business environment.
The presence of IS-Somalia also complicates the government’s counter-terrorism efforts by dividing attention and resources. Security forces now must contend with two distinct extremist organizations, each with its own ideology, tactics, and network. This dual threat stretches the already limited capacity of Somali security institutions and may require a reevaluation of current strategies.
Furthermore, the apparent shift in IS-Somalia’s tactics from violent coercion to a more structured “taxation” system mirrors Al-Shabab’s approach, suggesting a potential learning process among extremist groups. This adaptability underscores the need for equally flexible and innovative responses from government and security forces to effectively combat these evolving threats.
