Garowe, Puntland — Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” arrived in Puntland’s capital yesterday for high-stakes discussions with President Said Abdullahi Deni, recreating an alliance that three years ago proved instrumental in preventing Somalia from sliding into full-scale civil conflict. The meeting, occurring against a backdrop of constitutional manipulation, federal aggression against Jubaland, unrealistic electoral timelines, and Al-Shabab’s resurgence across southern Somalia, carries implications that extend far beyond regional solidarity to the very survival of Somalia’s federal project and its fragile democratic institutions.
The symbolism of Madobe’s arrival in Garowe cannot be overstated. Here stands a leader whom the Federal Government of Somalia has effectively criminalized, his case referred to the Attorney General following his overwhelming electoral victory, seeking common cause with another regional president who has severed all ties with Mogadishu over constitutional violations. Their convergence represents not merely a meeting of political allies but a potential crystallization of resistance against what both leaders characterize as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s systematic dismantling of Somalia’s federal architecture.
The parallels to 2021 are indeed striking. Then, as now, a president nearing the end of his mandate attempted to manipulate constitutional and electoral processes to maintain power. Then, as now, regional leaders found themselves forced to choose between acquiescence to federal overreach and active resistance. And then, as now, the streets of Mogadishu could become potential battlegrounds. The key difference lies in the sophistication of the current president’s approach—where Farmaajo relied on blunt force, Hassan Sheikh employs institutional manipulation and manufactured legitimacy.
The Constitutional Coup
The new constitution that President Hassan Sheikh has been advancing represents far more than a simple revision of governing documents; it constitutes what constitutional scholars describe as a fundamental reordering of Somalia’s political architecture. The changes, pushed through parliament in March 2024 without the consultation required by the provisional constitution, extend presidential terms from four to five years, dramatically expand executive powers at the expense of the prime minister, and—most controversially—grant the Federal Government unprecedented authority over regional electoral processes.
These modifications, achieved through what witnesses describe as a combination of bribery, intimidation, and procedural manipulation, have shattered the delicate balance between federal and regional authorities that has maintained relative stability since 2012. The unilateral addition of SSC-Khatumo as a federal member state, accomplished without the constitutional requirement of consensus among existing states, established precedents that threaten to fragment Somalia into ever-smaller units while paradoxically concentrating power in Mogadishu.
The Federal Government’s subsequent actions have only confirmed regional leaders’ worst fears about the implications of these constitutional changes. The deployment of approximately 200 troops to Ras Kamboni following Madobe’s electoral victory, the criminalization of a democratically elected leader, and the attempt to impose federal control over regional electoral processes all flow logically from the new constitutional framework. Each action builds upon the last, creating what opposition figures describe as a systematic campaign to eliminate regional autonomy.
Jubaland Under Siege
Ahmed Madobe’s journey to Garowe comes as his administration faces unprecedented pressure from Mogadishu. The Federal Government’s response to his landslide electoral victory—winning two-thirds of the vote in the first round—has included military deployments, legal proceedings, and attempts to establish parallel administrative structures. These actions, while ostensibly aimed at asserting federal authority, risk destabilizing one of Somalia’s most strategic regions at a time when security threats demand unified response.
The deployment of federal forces to Ras Kamboni represents a particularly provocative escalation. This coastal town, located 230 kilometers south of Kismayo, holds strategic significance as a potential staging ground for operations against Jubaland’s administration. The timing of the deployment—immediately following Madobe’s electoral victory—sends an unmistakable message about the Federal Government’s willingness to use military force to challenge democratic outcomes it finds inconvenient.
The criminalization of President Madobe through referral to the Attorney General adds a judicial dimension to the federal assault on Jubaland. The Federal Government seeks to delegitimize opposition through legal mechanisms rather than democratic competition. This tactic, familiar from authoritarian playbooks worldwide, represents a dangerous escalation in the use of state institutions for political persecution.
The Electoral Mirage
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the disconnect between Mogadishu’s rhetoric and reality than its handling of electoral timelines. The Federal Government continues to promote unrealistic schedules for national elections, setting dates that observers unanimously consider impossible to achieve given current political and security conditions. These announcements serve multiple purposes: they project an image of democratic progress for international consumption, provide excuses for extending current mandates when deadlines inevitably pass, and create leverage for pressuring regional states to accept federal oversight.
The pattern has become predictably cyclical. The government announces ambitious electoral timelines with great fanfare, international partners express cautious optimism, deadlines approach without meaningful preparation, new obstacles conveniently emerge, and extensions are granted with promises that next time will be different. This cycle has repeated so often that even sympathetic observers have begun questioning whether the Federal Government has any genuine intention of conducting elections or merely uses electoral promises as a political management tool.
The National Consultative Council’s promise of direct local elections across southern Somalia by June 30, 2024, has already joined the growing list of unfulfilled electoral commitments. Not a single direct election has occurred in south and central Somalia, while Puntland has successfully conducted elections in 36 districts despite federal obstruction. This contrast between regional achievement and federal failure underscores the manufactured nature of electoral delays—they serve political purposes rather than reflecting genuine logistical challenges.
Al-Shabab’s Opportunistic Resurgence
While Somalia’s political leaders engage in constitutional battles and electoral manipulations, Al-Shabab has seized the opportunity to reverse many of the territorial losses it suffered in recent years. The militant group has recaptured strategic districts including El Buur, Caad, and Ruun Nirgood, reestablished taxation systems in areas nominally under government control, and demonstrated its continued ability to strike at will in Mogadishu and other urban centers.
The security deterioration directly correlates with political fragmentation. As the Federal Government diverts resources and attention to confronting regional states, counter-terrorism efforts suffer from neglect and poor coordination. The Somali National Army, already weakened by corruption scandals and low morale, finds itself increasingly unable to hold territory without active support from regional forces—the very forces the Federal Government seeks to marginalize.
The militant group’s propaganda has evolved to exploit political tensions, presenting itself as a stable alternative to the chaos of federal politics. Recent Al-Shabab statements have mockingly referred to the Federal Government’s inability to control regional states while struggling to secure Mogadishu’s neighborhoods. This narrative, while serving terrorist objectives, resonates with populations exhausted by political instability and security failures.
The 2021 Precedent
The current Garowe summit inevitably evokes memories of the crucial role regional leaders played in resolving the 2021 constitutional crisis. When former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo attempted to extend his term through parliamentary manipulation, the resulting political confrontation brought Mogadishu to the brink of civil war. Opposition forces seized portions of the capital, military units split along clan lines, and the international community watched with alarm as Somalia teetered on the edge of state collapse.
The intervention of regional leaders, particularly the alliance between Presidents Deni and Madobe, proved decisive in pulling the country back from this precipice. Their combined pressure—political, economic, and implicit military threat—forced Farmaajo to abandon his term extension and accept a negotiated electoral process. President Deni’s strong performance in the subsequent presidential election, leading in the first round before the eventual victory of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, demonstrated the political weight regional leaders could marshal when united.
Yet crucial differences distinguish the current crisis from its 2021 predecessor. President Hassan Sheikh’s approach proves more sophisticated than Farmaajo’s crude power grab, employing institutional manipulation rather than simple deadline extension. The constitutional changes already enacted provide legal cover for actions that would have required naked force three years ago. The international community, exhausted by repeated Somali crises and distracted by global conflicts, shows less appetite for intensive engagement.
The Garowe Agenda
Sources close to the Garowe discussions indicate that Presidents Deni and Madobe seek to move beyond reactive crisis management toward proactive agenda-setting for Somalia’s political future. Their discussions reportedly encompass not just resistance to federal overreach but also alternative visions for electoral processes, constitutional governance, and security cooperation that respect federal principles while addressing national challenges.
The security dimension features prominently in these discussions. Both Puntland and Jubaland have maintained relative stability through locally-led security efforts, developing capabilities and strategies adapted to their specific contexts. Their potential collaboration could demonstrate alternative approaches to counter-terrorism that don’t depend on centralized control or international forces. This model—federal units cooperating horizontally rather than through Mogadishu’s mediation—challenges fundamental assumptions about security architecture in post-conflict states.
Economic cooperation also appears on the agenda. Both states control significant ports and trade routes, generating revenues that the Federal Government eyes hungrily. By coordinating policies and potentially establishing direct trade relationships, they could create economic facts on the ground that reinforce political autonomy. Such initiatives would particularly resonate with business communities frustrated by Mogadishu’s predatory taxation and regulatory uncertainty.
