Hargeisa, SOMALIA – One year after the seismic defeat of Somaliland forces in Gojacade by the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-Khatumo) forces, the region finds itself once again on the brink of potential conflict. This pivotal battle, which saw SSC-Khatumo forces aided by thousands of Harti clan fighters defeat Somaliland forces, has reshaped the political and military landscape of the Horn of Africa.
The Battle of Gojacade marked a significant turning point in Somaliland’s territorial ambitions, effectively halting its expansion into areas claimed by SSC-Khatumo. The scale of Somaliland’s defeat was unprecedented, with the loss of 9 tanks, 7 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and sixty technicals, including 20 equipped with anti-aircraft cannons. The capture of 450 prisoners, including the general leading Somaliland’s forces in the region, further underscored the magnitude of this military setback. With estimated deaths ranging from 600 to 1,000, the human cost of Somaliland’s defeat reached new heights.
The Reclamation of Sool
The events of August 25, 2023, stand as a watershed moment in the war. On this day, SSC-Khatumo forces, spearheaded by local Dhulbahante militias and bolstered by thousands of fighters from Harti clans, successfully recaptured all areas in Sool claimed by their movement. This comprehensive victory not only dealt a severe blow to Somaliland’s military capabilities but also fundamentally altered the balance of power in the territories.
The mobilization of clansmen from across Somalia, disengaging from positions in the south, the Somali National Army (SNA), and even from within Somaliland’s own forces, to join their kinsmen in the liberation of Sool, demonstrates the powerful pull of clan loyalty in Somali politics. This massive influx of fighters played a crucial role in tipping the scale of the war in favor of SSC-Khatumo, highlighting the challenges Somaliland faces in asserting control over areas with strong clan affiliations different from its core support base.
The war expanded beyond its initial focal point as subsequent battles in the Togdheer region inflicted further losses on Somaliland forces. The loss of villages that Somaliland (Isaaq) clansmen had established since 2007, during a period when SSC-Khatumo and its allies were preoccupied elsewhere, represents a significant reversal of Somaliland’s demographic and territorial gains over the past decade and a half.
These defeats in Togdheer not only compound Somaliland’s military setbacks but also challenge its narrative of effective control and governance in the disputed territories. The erosion of Somaliland’s presence in areas it had successfully settled raises questions about the sustainability of its territorial claims and its ability to maintain control over diverse clan-based populations.
Threats of Recapture Amid Unfavorable Odds
Despite the significant setbacks suffered in Gojacade and Togdheer, Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi has issued threats to retake the lost regions. However, an analysis of the situation on the ground suggests that such ambitions face formidable obstacles. Somaliland was left it in a precarious military position, with its forces effectively disarmed by SSC-Khatumo in the disputed territories.
The substantial loss of military hardware, including tanks, APCs, and technicals, has significantly degraded Somaliland’s offensive capabilities. Moreover, the capture of high-ranking officers and the high casualty rate have likely impacted morale and operational effectiveness. In this context, President Bihi’s threats of recapture appear to be more political posturing than a reflection of military reality, underscoring the complex interplay between domestic politics and territorial ambitions in the war.
The unified response of Harti clans to the call for support in liberating Sool represents a critical aspect of the Somaliland-SSC-Khatumo war. This demonstration of clan solidarity across political and geographical boundaries highlights the enduring strength of clan ties in Somali society and their potential to supersede formal state structures and allegiances.
The willingness of Harti clansmen to disengage from various military and political entities, including the SNA and even Somaliland’s own forces, to support their kinsmen in SSC-Khatumo, presents a significant challenge to Somaliland’s strategy of integration and control in the disputed territories. This clan-based mobilization suggests that any future attempts by Somaliland to reassert control in Sool and other areas may face similar unified resistance, further complicating Somaliland’s territorial ambitions.
A New Player in the Equation
The role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) emerges as a critical factor in the evolving dynamics of the conflict. The potential for the FGS to use SSC-Khatumo as a proxy in its wider dispute with Somalia’s northwest regions, particularly concerning the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia, adds another layer of complexity to an already intricate situation.
The FGS’s support for SSC-Khatumo could significantly strengthen the latter’s position, providing political legitimacy, potential military support, and international diplomatic backing. This alignment of interests between the FGS and SSC-Khatumo poses a formidable challenge to Somaliland’s aspirations in the region, potentially transforming the crisis from a local territorial dispute into a proxy conflict with national and regional implications.
