Mogadishu, SOMALIA – In an event aimed at rallying support for the Somali National Army (SNA) yesterday, Brigadier General Madey Nurey Sheikh Ufurow, the Deputy Commander of the SNA, made a bold declaration: Al-Shabab will be decisively defeated within the month of June. This statement, while intended to boost morale and inspire confidence, rings hollow when juxtaposed against the harsh realities on the ground. The SNA’s fight against Al-Shabab has been marred by a series of overly optimistic promises from military and political leaders, which have consistently failed to materialize in the face of the complex challenges posed by the terrorist group.
General Ufurow’s claim of an imminent victory against Al-Shabab is not an isolated incident. It is part of a broader pattern of unrealistic promises made by SNA leadership and government officials. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his national security advisor have made similar assertions in the past, setting ambitious timelines for the defeat of Al-Shabab that have come and gone without significant progress. These empty promises not only undermine the credibility of the SNA and the government but also create false expectations among the Somali people, who have suffered the brunt of the conflict.
The repeated failure to meet these self-imposed deadlines raises serious questions about the SNA’s ability to effectively combat Al-Shabab and the government’s grasp of the situation on the ground. It suggests a disconnect between the lofty aspirations of the leadership and the actual capacity of the military to achieve those goals. Moreover, it points to a worrying trend of using optimistic rhetoric as a substitute for tangible action and progress.
The Reality on the Ground
The reality of the conflict between the SNA and Al-Shabab paints a far more complex and challenging picture than the one suggested by General Ufurow’s promise of a swift victory. The SNA’s campaign against the terrorist group, which began in June 2022, has been marked by a series of hard-fought battles and setbacks. While the military has managed to liberate some areas from Al-Shabab’s control, it has struggled to maintain those gains in the face of determined resistance from the group.
Two stark examples of this dynamic are the towns of Masagawaa and El Dheer in the Galgaduud region. Despite being liberated by the SNA in the early stages of the campaign, these areas have since been encircled by Al-Shabab, effectively cutting them off from ground supply routes. The only way to keep them provisioned is through costly sea and air supplies, highlighting the logistical challenges faced by the SNA in maintaining control over territory.
Similarly, the town of Ruun-Nirgood in the Middle Shabelle region, which is on the main road to Masagawaa, has changed hands multiple times throughout the conflict, with the SNA and Al-Shabab engaging in a brutal tug-of-war for control. The SNA is currently massing troops in the nearby town of Nuur Dugle, preparing for another attempt to re-take Ruun-Nirgood. However, the fact that the same territory has been fought over repeatedly underscores the difficulties the SNA faces in achieving a decisive victory against a resilient and adaptable enemy.
Leadership and Morale Challenges
Compounding the challenges posed by Al-Shabab’s tenacity are the internal issues plaguing the SNA itself. The elite commando unit Gorgor’s 18th Brigade, is expected to spearhead the operation to re-take Ruun-Nirgood. However, this unit has suffered from heavy attrition and suffers from poor leadership, with many of its officers having been killed in battle or court-martialed for failures against Al-Shabab.
The high attrition rate and leadership vacuum within the 18th Brigade are symptomatic of broader issues affecting the SNA as a whole. The constant strain of combat operations, coupled with inadequate resources and support, has taken a heavy toll on the morale and effectiveness of the military. Soldiers often lack basic necessities and equipment, while desertion rates remain high.
These internal challenges raise doubts about the SNA’s ability to mount a successful offensive against Al-Shabab, let alone achieve the decisive victory promised by General Ufurow. Without addressing these fundamental issues of leadership, morale, and logistics, the SNA risks repeating the cycle of hard-fought gains followed by painful setbacks that has characterized the conflict thus far.
