Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni used today’s graduation of new Special Forces from the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) to articulate a sweeping critique of Mogadishu’s political trajectory and to redefine his own region’s security posture. Rejecting participation in the upcoming National Consultative Conference (NCC) in Mogadishu unless the 2012 Constitution is fully reinstated, President Deni also announced a willingness to relinquish Puntland’s leadership of the SSC (Sool-Sanaag-Cayn) initiative, openly acknowledged Somaliland’s right to self-determination, and outlined an expanded counter-terrorism campaign that will advance into the Al-Madow hills once Al-Miskad yields to local forces.
While the ceremony’s foremost purpose was to recognize the PMPF’s newly minted special-operations cadre—trained in maritime interdiction, rapid deployment, and close-quarters battle—Deni’s remarks swiftly turned to the political and security crises that have shadowed Somalia for the past two years.
Constitutional Standoff
President Deni framed Puntland’s absence from the NCC as principled resistance to Mogadishu’s unilateral constitutional amendments. Since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government pushed through an array of changes in early 2024—bypassing established consultative forums—Puntland’s leadership has maintained that the original 2012 charter, however flawed, enshrined the delicate balance between central authority and regional autonomy. By insisting on a full reinstatement of that document before attending the NCC, Deni underscored the depth of federal-regional mistrust.
Puntland’s boycott illustrates a broader dilemma in Somalia’s federal experiment. Constitutional legitimacy—and the process by which it is attained—has emerged as a litmus test for political inclusion. President Deni’s stance leverages Puntland’s security contributions to extract concessions on governance, signaling that military cooperation alone will not substitute for substantive power-sharing. His refusal also places Mogadishu under pressure: proceed without Puntland and risk further delegitimizing the NCC, or reopen constitution-making to rebuild consensus.
SSC’s Future
Historically, Puntland backed local SSC militias resisting Somaliland’s territorial claims in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. Yet Deni now characterizes the SSC construct as a tool co-opted by Mogadishu—an instrument wielded to cast Puntland as an obstructionist actor. By offering SSC communities a “clean break,” he shifts responsibility for the region’s future to its own clans, effectively decoupling Puntland’s political brand from SSC fortunes.
This policy reversal carries both risks and opportunities. On one hand, it acknowledges the SSC leadership’s desire for self-determination without tying them indefinitely to Puntland’s agenda. In the short term, Deni’s gambit may strengthen his negotiating position with Mogadishu—he can credibly claim that Puntland is no longer an obstacle. Longer term, it could lead to fragmentation if SSC communities falter without external backing.
Rethinking Somaliland Relations
For decades, Puntland has officially championed Somalia’s territorial integrity, rejecting Somaliland’s 1991 secession. In Bosaso today, however, President Deni affirmed Puntland’s readiness to engage in peaceful, mutually beneficial relations. Economic cooperation on border crossings, joint security patrols against smugglers, and shared infrastructure projects now top the agenda.
Puntland positions itself as a pragmatic intermediary—able to benefit from cross-border trade while insulating itself from Hargeisa’s claim for international recognition. Politically, the move may shore up Deni’s standing among Puntland’s business class and further isolate hard-line federal politicians who continue to insist on a unitary state.
On counter terrorism, President Deni signaled that, having largely defeated ISIS-Somalia’s presence in the Al-Miskad Mountains, Puntland’s security forces—and especially the newly graduated PMPF Special Forces—will soon turn their focus northward into the Al-Madow range. There, they will confront residual ISIS elements alongside Al-Shabab contingents that have exploited the federal government’s preoccupation with constitutional disputes.Expanding operations into Al-Madow serves multiple purposes. It projects Puntland’s autonomy in security affairs, compensating for its reluctance to participate in Mogadishu-led campaigns.
